8.1.1. Attacks on surfaces

The goals 1/4

The goals of the talk

  1. Examine attack surfaces in a cloud
  2. Learn about novel attacks on clouds

Traditional systems security versus cloud computing security 2/4

Traditional system analogy

Securing a house

  1. Owner and user are often the same entity,
  2. Concerns of users:
    • secure perimeter,
    • check for intruders,
    • secure assets.

Cloud computing analogy

Securing a hotel

  1. Owner and user are almost always different entities,
  2. Concerns of users:
    • secure room against the bad guy in next room,
    • protect room against the hotel owner.

Attack surface in the context of cloud computing 3/4

Attack surface definition

A system’s attack surface is the subset of the system’s resources that an attacker can use in order to attack the system.

Clouds extend the attack surface

  • users communicate with the cloud over a public (possibly insecure) communication network,
  • the infrastructure is shared among multiple users.

Participants in cloud computing

A cloud computing scenario can be modelled using three classes of participants:

  • service users,
  • service instances,
  • cloud provider.

Interaction in cloud computing

Every interaction in the cloud computing scenario can be adressed by two participants (e.g. user requesting a service or the service instance inquiring more CPU power from the cloud).

Attack in cloud computing

Similar, every attack can be detailed into a set of interactions within this 3-class model.

Fig. 8.1.1/1: Figure from   : 1 

Exemplary attacks on surfaces 4/4

a) SERVICE-to-USER

This is the common server-to-client interface, which includes (among others) the following attacks:

buffer overflow

SQL injection

privilege escalation

b) USER-to-SERVICE

The attack surface the service user provides to the service include attacks like:

SSL certificate spoofing

browser cache attacks

phishing attacks on mail clients

c) CLOUD-to-SERVICE

The cloud-to-service interface allows to perform attacks like:

resource exhaustion, i.e. popularly called Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS)

hypervisor attacks

d) SERVICE-to-CLOUD

This interface can be user to perform the following attacks:

  • availability reduction (i.e. shut down service instances),
  • privacy related attacks (scanning a service instance’s data in process),
  • malicious inteferences (e.g. tampering data in process, injection of operations in services execution).

e) CLOUD-to-USER

This touch point does not really exist (there always exists a service between cloud and user). However, the cloud system must provide a way to control it, i.e. to allow to add and delete service instances. Attacks allowed by this interface are similar to point a).

f) USER-to-CLOUD

This last attack surface that includes phishing-like attacks to trigger a user into manipulating its cloud-provided services (e.g. present a faked usage bill of the cloud provider).

Bibliography 1/1

1

N. Gruschka, M. Jensen,: “Attack Surfaces: A Taxonomy for Attacks on Cloud Services”

2

S. Subashini, V. Kavitha: “A survey on security issues in service delivery models of cloud computing”.




Projekt Cloud Computing – nowe technologie w ofercie dydaktycznej Politechniki Wrocławskiej (UDA.POKL.04.03.00-00-135/12)jest realizowany w ramach Programu Operacyjnego Kapitał Ludzki, Priorytet IV. Szkolnictwo wyższe i nauka, Działanie 4.3. Wzmocnienie potencjału dydaktycznego uczelni w obszarach kluczowych w kontekście celów Strategii Europa 2020, współfinansowanego ze środków Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego i budżetu Państwa